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SUMMARY
Securing communication in data networks has been a problem of interest since
the time of conception of network based communication. With the explosive growth
in the usage of wireless data networks over the last several years, increasing attention
is now being paid to specifically securing communication in wireless environments.
Using air as the medium, while having its obvious advantages centered around tether-
less communication, does significantly increase the complexity of challenges pertaining
to security. The unique nature of the wireless medium enables an attacker to conduct
new kind of attacks such as finger printing and passive eavesdropping without being
noticed unlike in a wired context, where interception requires tampering the physi-
cal medium. Current wireless security techniques are predominantly cryptographic
in nature, where it is typically assumed that the adversary has access to all the in-
formation and the techniques are designed to make it computationally hard for the
adversary to understand the true meaning of the information. Further, such schemes
are aimed only at preserving confidentiality of messages, leaving aside several privacy
attacks such as fingerprinting. Simultaneously with these developments, sophistica-
tion in antenna technology has led to the emergence of smart antennas, which employ
signal processing to obtain more degrees of freedom for communication. Some of the
benefits of this technology include increased communication range, reliability and
performance. In this context, the goal of this work is to explore how smart antennas
can be used to tackle the unique security challenges due to the wireless medium.
Specifically, the scope of this thesis is restricted to securing communication over
wireless data networks, and further limited to a specific form of adversarial behav-
ior - eavesdropping. In this context, we define a metric called the exposure region
viii
that refers to the area within which an eavesdropper can access and decode the sig-
nals being transmitted and first investigate the baseline performance improvements
achievable when using adaptive-arrays for beamforming. We show that simple beam-
forming gives benefits sub-linear in the number of elements and also leaves several
common scenarios unprotected. We then propose a suite of strategies that use arrays
of arrays to provide considerable reductions in the exposure region, called secret shar-
ing, controlled jamming and stream overwhelming. We present the solutions in the
realistic context of a virtual array of physical arrays, where multiple access points (in
the same administrative domain), each equipped with a physical antenna array, are
used in tandem to achieve the strategies. Using a combination of simulations, real-life
field trials, and analysis, we demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed solution.
ix
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Securing communication in data networks has been a problem of interest since the
time of conception of network based communication [14, 16]. The term security, in
the context of communication networking, broadly includes several forms including
confidentiality/privacy, authentication, availability, non-repudiation, and integrity.
With the explosive growth in the usage of wireless data networks over the last several
years, increasing attention is now being paid to specifically securing communication in
wireless environments. Using air as the medium, while having its obvious advantages
centered around tether-less communication, does significantly increase the complexity
of challenges pertaining to security. Cryptography based techniques including the
wired equivalent privacy (WEP), the wi-fi protected access (WPA), and the 802.11i
WPA2 are all examples of techniques that protect wireless communication.
One of the primary properties of such cryptography based techniques is that they
hide the meaning of the information being communicated, but not the existence of the
information itself. In other words, it is typically assumed that the adversary has access
to all the information and the techniques are designed to make it computationally hard
for the adversary to understand the true meaning of the information. In this work,
we focus on a somewhat orthogonal form of securing communication that is broadly
classified into what is sometimes referred to as physical security. While the term
encompasses a wide variety of techniques, it typically refers to approaches that limit
knowledge of the existence of the information at the adversary. In other words, the
goal is to prevent the adversary from even getting access to the information in the
first place. It is imperative to note here that the notion of physical security is by no
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means a replacement for traditional cryptography, but should be strictly seen as a
complimentary strategy to better foil the attempts of an adversary.
The scope of this work is restricted to securing communication over wireless data
networks, and further limited to a specific form of adversarial behavior - eavesdrop-
ping. With the growing deployment of wireless data networks, and more specifically
wireless LAN (WLAN) hotspots at very high-densities, it is relatively easy for even a
casual user to turn into an adversary by eavesdropping on ongoing communication in
such a wireless network. This coupled with the fact that increasingly more applica-
tions, including ones that would require high degrees of confidentiality such as voice-
over-IP, are being used over wireless data networks makes it an important problem to
tackle.Specifically, we consider an emerging class of antenna technologies - smart an-
tennas, to achieve higher levels of protection against eavesdropping. Smart antennas
include a broad variety of technologies ranging from simple switched beam antennas
to more sophisticated adaptive arrays and multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)
techniques. Irrespective of the specific technology used, a common defining charac-
teristic of smart antennas is their use of sophisticated signal processing capabilities to
achieve better spectral efficiencies, interference suppression, and increased reliability
among other benefits. A related property of smart antenna techniques is their ability
to focus communication energy spatially, thus providing a natural platform to build
techniques to provide physical security based strategies to tackle eavesdropping.
In this context, we define a metric called the exposure region that refers to the
area within which an eavesdropper can access and decode the signals being transmit-
ted1, and first investigate the baseline performance improvements achievable when
using adaptive-arrays for beam-forming. We show that the improvements achiev-
able are sub-linear with k, the number of elements on the antenna-array, and the
1We define the metric more formally later in the thesis.
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improvements can further be smaller when taking into account scattering in typi-
cal indoor environments and link-margins required to tackle fading. Perhaps equally
importantly, in high density environments where trusted physical spaces might not
necessarily be contiguous, this still leaves a non-trivial region of exposure between
the transmitter and the receiver that can be exploited by potential eavesdroppers.
We then propose a suite of strategies that use arrays of arrays to provide con-
siderable reductions in the exposure region. The strategies, secret sharing,controlled
jamming and stream overwhelming are predicated on two principles to limit an eaves-
dropper’s ability to access and decode information: (i) spatial diversity: split and send
information over a diverse number of pathways such that an eavesdropper’s probabil-
ity to access all parts of an information is reduced; and (ii) signal overload: overload
the number of signals or pieces of information accessible at any given point in the
network space such that an eavesdropper’s probability of being overwhelmed enough
to prevent decoding of any part of the information is increased. We present the so-
lutions in the realistic context of a virtual array of physical arrays, where multiple
access points (in the same administrative domain), each equipped with a physical
antenna array, are used in tandem to achieve the strategies. Using a combination
of simulations, real-life field trials, and analysis, we demonstrate the efficacy of the
proposed solution.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 defines the scope for
the work and presents background information including the performance when using
beam-forming with smart antennas. Chapter 3 presents the three strategies that
use virtual arrays of physical arrays to reduce exposure regions and analyzes the
performance benefits of each strategy in isolation. Chapter 4 describes the details
of the solution including the integrated operations for the three strategies, while
Chapter 5 presents practical realization of the algorithms. Chapter 6 presents the
performance results using simulations and the field trials. Chapter 7 discusses related
3
work. Chapter 8 summarizes the thesis with directions for future work.
1.1 Thesis
Thus, the contributions of this work are four-fold:
• We introduce the notion of physical space security in wireless data networks
through a metric called the exposure region, and study the performance levels
achievable when using adaptive-array smart antennas.
• We present a set of strategies that use (virtual) arrays of (physical) arrays
to substantially reduce the exposure region, and demonstrate the performance
using extensive simulations.
• We also describe an algorithm that synergistically integrates the techniques
in the context of wireless local area networks and evaluate the performance
achievable using simulations.
• We discuss the practical realization of the approach and demonstrate the ben-
efits using field trials .
4
CHAPTER II
SCOPE AND MOTIVATION
In this chapter, we describe the scope of the work namely the environment, metric and
the assumptions about the eavesdropper. Then, we describe the need for and use of a
”physical space security” approach. Subsequently, we describe how beamforming can
be applied as a baseline strategy for securing against eavesdropping. We highlight
why such a technique is insufficient by itself and summarize the motivations for a
better physical space security technique.
2.1 Scope
Here the considerations of the environment and eavesdropper capabilities are de-
scribed, along with a formal definition of the developed security metric.
2.1.1 Environment
The wireless environment considered is that of a Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN),
which consists of p wireless Access Points (APs), each equipped with a k-element an-
tenna array and one or more clients, each equipped with a single omni-directional
antenna or an array of upto k-elements. While it is possible that there is a strong
Line-of-Sight (LOS) path between the AP and a client, it is also possible to have a rich
scattering environment. Further, the degree of fading and the richness of scattering
will also vary for different indoor environments. Thus, to begin with, we consider a
strong LOS path between an AP and each client. Later, in Sections 3 and 6 we show
how this assumption is relaxed to include rich scattering and absence of LOS paths to
the clients. We assume that any frequency selective fading is combatted by the use of
improved modulation schemes such as Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing
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(OFDM) as in current WLAN devices. Further, since the mobility of indoor users is
typically low, we do not consider the effect of fast-fading, but consider rapid and vari-
able path loss effects that are typical in an indoor environment. Finally, we assume
the clients to be primarily static but consider mobility later in our discussions.
2.1.2 Metric
To quantify the security achieved against eavesdropping, we define a new security
metric called the the total exposure region of the network, ERN . This is turn, is defined
as the union of the exposure regions of all the clients in the network1. The exposure
region of the ith client, ER(Ci), is given by the region in which an eavesdropper can
decode the information of client i.
ERN =
Nc⋃
i=1
ER(Ci) (1)
where Nc is the total number of clients in the network. We initially consider a 2-D
network, where region refers to area. Note that the above metric applies to both
homogenous and heterogenous antenna capabilities (although we restrict our focus
only to a homogenous network). Further, the exposure region of a client is also a
function of the receiver’s (or eavesdropper’s) antenna gains. Thus, all references to
the metric are for a fixed eavesdropper antenna capability.
2.1.3 Eavesdropper
Our eavesdropper model is captured by the following set of assumptions for the eaves-
dropper M :
1. M is a wireless node with k antenna elements (where k <= the number of
elements at each AP)2.
1A similar but equivalent definition can be given in terms of exposure region of APs.
2Later, in chapter 6 we discuss the capabilities required at the eavesdropper to combat the
techniques proposed in the thesis, and establish how this condition can be relaxed when all solutions
presented are used in tandem.
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2. M has access to location information of all the clients and APs.
3. M can perform sophisticated antenna processing with its available elements.
4. APs do not have any information about the position of M or its strategy.
We initially consider the eavesdropper to operate in isolation, but later consider the
case of colluding eavesdroppers. We consider both perimeter security and physical
security (i.e. security against an eavesdropper situated just outside the physical
perimeter of the network or inside the network respectively).
2.2 Adaptive array smart antennas
Adaptive array smart antennas employ an array of antenna elements coupled with
both amplitude and phase weighting, thereby making it possible to tune and obtain
a large set of angular and spatial patterns. The process of choosing antenna element
weights such that the Signal to Noise ratio (SNR) at the receiver is maximized is called
beamforming. Also, when a strong LOS path is unavailable or multipath is rich, simple
beam-steering is less effective and the pattern that maximizes the receiver’s SNR
does not necessarily have a main beam pointing towards the direction of the client.
However, when the weights are appropriately chosen, adaptive arrays work well even
in the presence of scattering. Also depending on whether the weight adjustments are
performed at the transmitter or receiver, the technique is called transmit beamforming
or receive beamforming respectively [6].
Another important feature of adaptive arrays, is their ability to place nulls in
desired directions. The number of elements on the array is typically called the number
of Degrees of Freedom (DOF). With a k element array, it is possible to place k − 1
nulls in the pattern and use the remaining one DOF for the desired communication.
The k − 1 nulls can be used by a transmitter to restrict the transmitted signals
from propagating along unwanted directions and causing intereference, while they
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can also be used by a receiver to nullify signals (interference) received in certain
directions. Thus, a communication between two nodes equipped with arrays can be
made successful by performing one of the above two strategies. However, when more
than k streams are received at a receiver, the SNR of all these communication streams
is degraded. Although the actual degradation will depend on the power levels, we
assume that more than k received streams can cause enough interference to make the
communication at the receiver unsuccessful.
In summary, the key properties of adaptive arrays that are relevant to this work are
the following:
1. A transmitter can control where it causes interference by the appropriate place-
ment of nulls in its pattern.
2. A receiver can null interference only from up to k − 1 transmissions. Beyond
that, it is unable to decode or resolve the transmissions.
3. It is sufficient for either the interfering transmitter to suppress interference to
an unintended receiver, or for that receiver to suppress interference from an
unintended transmitter.
4. When more than k parallel transmissions happen within an interference range,
all transmissions suffer a reduction in Signal to Interference and Noise ratio
(SINR) that will make the signal undecodable.
2.3 Why physical space-security?
While security techniques could be incorporated at different layers of the protocol
stack much of the wireless security in the context of WLANs has been above layer
4. i.e the security is typically end to end security. While this kind of software only
security might defend against several attacks, it is still insufficient and leaves much
room for the attacker. For instance [4] , shows how WEP technique can be broken
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in a matter of few minutes and more importantly, even WPA2 with its AES ( the
latest security technique) can be broken without exorbitant effort. These observations
point out that just employing higher layer cryptographic techniques is not sufficient
for wireless security. Thus alternative ways are also highly desirable. In this context,
the idea of physical space security is to provide security at the wireless transmission
level. This is a complimentary approach to higher layer encapsulation/cryptographic
techniques. However, it becomes very valuable and desirable in a wireless context due
to the following reasons:
1. Tapping the wireless channel is much simpler than a wired channel and as men-
tioned in [4], all higher layer security techniques (including the latest WPA2)
are rendered less effective in a WLAN than in a wired context. The increasing
computational power that is available commonly ( such as multi-core comput-
ing) weakens the protection afforded by techniques which rely on computational
complexity. Further, flaws/bugs in the implementation seriously impact the se-
curity afforded by higher layer techniques.
2. Higher layer cryptography alone does not attempt to reduce packet interception,
because significant additional information such as packet sizes, timing of packets
can still be extracted to understand application/protocol behavior and also for
user fingerprinting [20]. In such cases, the privacy of users is compromised.
3. Improvements in system design and signal processing now make per packet
operations on the transmissions feasible. Such techniques are already performed
in some commercial products like ’Ruckus Beamflex’ [3] and recommended in
the standards like 802.11n. Thus, given these improved capabilities and the
inadequacy of current higher layer security techniques, providing security at the
transmission/link level becomes highly relevant. Also,many situations already
involve directional antennas as a must for the consistent performance and in
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such cases an orthogonal security technique will be capacity wasteful, whereas,
the physical security would not be so.
4. Finally, physical security being orthogonal to existing securing techniques, wouldn’t
violate higher layer approaches as it only minimizes interception at the eaves-
dropper but leaves legitimate clients unaffected.
2.4 A Simple Approach to Enhancing Security using Smart
Antennas
Smart antennas have been conventionally used for optimizing different communication
parameters such as data rate, reliability, transmission power, increased communica-
tion range; etc. In the context of security, the direct relevance of smart antenna
capabilities is their ability to beamform and achieve interference suppression to coun-
teract jamming. Specifically, when the directions of arrival of the jammers are known,
then it is possible to produce a null in the directions of the jammers. Again, the num-
ber of jammers that can be suppressed is utmost k − 1 for a k element array. Apart
from jamming, to the best of our knowledge, smart antennas have thus far not been
considered to tackle other security issues.
2.4.1 Mechanism
A straight-forward, simple technique to reduce the possibility of eavesdropping using
smart antennas is to employ beamforming. When a transmitter or receiver or both
perform beamforming, the signal is contained in a specific region between them de-
pending on the shape of the beam patterns and the antenna gains. But, the exposure
region for that communication will also depend on the eavesdropper’s antenna capa-
bilities and would increase when an eavesdropper has increasing number of antennas.
In the rest of this section, we study the benefits of such a simple strategy in terms
of exposure region reduction, and present approximations for the same.
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2.4.2 Benefits
We now analyze how the security benefit (reduction of exposure region) of the simple
beamforming mechanism compares to that of a scenario with omni directional anten-
nas. Even with uniform illumination of the array, it is a difficult problem to obtain
a closed form expression for the exposure region. Hence, we present approximations
for the exposure regions of beamforming using a geometric model and also validate
the model and resulting trends using simulations. The scenario we consider is that
of a single AP communicates with a single client in the presence of an eavesdropper.
To begin with, we consider that the AP has a k element array and both the client
and eavesdropper have an omnidirectional antenna. We show later that the resulting
trends are similar as long as the client and eavesdropper have comparable antenna
capabilities.
Geometrical analysis:
We now use geometrical considerations to obtain an approximate expression for the
exposure area of simple beamforming. We consider two approximations for the area
covered by beamforming namely the inscribed parallelogram and the sector as shown in
the Figure 1. Let d be the AP-client distance and h the width of the beam in distance
units as shown in the figure. The distance d can be measured from the transmission
power and the free space propagation laws, given a receive power threshold P th as
follows:
d = (
Pt ∗Gt ∗Gr ∗ (λ)2
4 ∗ pi ∗ Pth )
1
α (2)
where Pt is the transmit power, Gt and Gr are main lobe gains of the transmit and
receive antenna and λ is the wavelength used.
The area with a sector model is given by
A2 =
1
2
d2 ∗ θ (3)
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where θ is the null-null beamwidth of the transmitting or receive antenna. For a
linear array with k elements and a uniform excitation, it is given by
θ = 2 ∗ sin−1( 2
k
) (4)
As a function of k, the distance can be written as
d = c1 ∗ k 1α (5)
where c1 = ( Pt∗(λ)
2
4∗pi∗Pth
)
1
α . Then the area of the sector approximation A2′ is given by
A2′ = 2 ∗ c12 ∗ k 2α ∗ sin−1( 2
k
) (6)
When dividing the omni-directional area by this value, the ratio of exposure regions
is given by
A1
A2′
=
pi
2
∗ k
1
α
sin−1( 2
k
)
(7)
For large values of k, equation 7 can be approximated by,
A1
A2′
=
pi ∗ k1+ 1α
4
(8)
while repeating the above for the parallelogram case (for small values of α) we get,
A1
A2′′
=
pi ∗ √k2 − 4
2
(9)
The error in the expressions is not the same for different values of k and α. The
errors were identified by numerical analysis and for the case of α = 4, the sector
model provides results within 16% of the actual area. This indicates that the ex-
posure area improvement with increasing number of elements grows near-linearly for
large number of antenna elements when α is high. On the other hand, for low values
of α the benefit is less than linear in k. Since the sector approximation overestimates
the region, the benefit is bounded to a linear increase with k. Thus, for most cases
of relevance, the benefit grows as a sub-linear function in k.
12
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Figure 1: Beamforming area approximation
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Figure 2: Beamforming benefits
Quantitative analysis:
We now consider the exposure region with actual link margins. Specifically, we study
how the benefits vary as a function of the relevant network parameters, namely num-
ber of antennas and the path loss exponent. The default values of parameters used
are link fade margin of 3dB, 4 antenna elements, and a path loss exponent of 4. We
specifically consider two effects, namely the impact of the number of antenna ele-
ments and the impact of the path loss exponent. The results are shown in Figure 2.
Impact of k: When the number of antenna elements is increased, the exposure region
decreases. This is reasonable as the beamwidth gets narrower as the number of ele-
ments is increased (a 1
k
dependence as described in [15]). However, more importantly,
the decrease rate is less than linear. This means that we get diminishing returns with
additional antenna elements. Also it is important to observe that the exposure region
has a similar trend as long as the client and eavesdropper have the same number of
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antenna elements. This is because, when the AP reduces its transmitted signal power
to utilize the antenna gain (for the same received power threshold), both the client
and eavesdropper would use their respective gains (same) for reception. Impact of α:
The path loss exponent also plays an important role in deciding the exposure region.
Specifically, Figure 2 shows the variation of exposure region with the path loss ex-
ponent. In general, the exposure region increases as the path loss increases. This is
reasonable since, a higher transmit power would be required for a larger path loss,
so that the received signal power crosses the threshold at the intended receiver. The
use of higher transmit power also means that the beam area increases.On the other
hand, increasing path loss exponent does not increase the area when the beamwidth
is small.
2.4.3 Summary and Motivation
The above results clearly indicate the sub-linear (in k) security benefits possible with
simple beamforming, with an example reduction in exposure region by a factor of
half for a six fold increase in antenna elements. This clearly motivate the need for
additional mechanisms for reducing the exposure region and increasing the security
benefits. While, beamforming provides a first level security mechanism with a sub-
linear k fold improvement, the key question we ask is whether it is possible for a more
intelligent scheme to achieve larger benefits? In this context, we recall some of the
limitations of beamforming: (i) With the higher path loss exponent (typical in indoor
environments), beamforming creates a larger exposure region. (ii) Since the benefit
with increasing number of antenna elements is sub-linear, the security benefit may not
always be sufficient. (iii) It handles only contiguous region security; i.e. adversaries
who are outside the common region of the transmitter and receiver, are prevented
from receiving a sufficient signal, but if an eavesdropper is present in between the
transmitter and receiver, security is compromised. While such security would be
14
useful for many cases (like an enterprise where entry into the premises is possible only
after physical inspection), we argue that it is not sufficient for WLAN environments
where the transmitter and receiver can potentially exist in non-contiguous secure
spaces. (iv) When a link margin is used (as is typically the case in practice), the
area in which an eavesdropper may be able to receive a sufficient signal would be
increased.
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CHAPTER III
VIRTUAL ARRAYS OF PHYSICAL ARRAYS
In this chapter, we introduce three strategies for improving security in wireless envi-
ronments using smart antennas that rely on the usage of a virtual array of physical
arrays. Essentially, inspired by several recent studies about high density access-point
deployments ([5, 18]), we exploit the availability of multiple access-points (APs) in
a single WLAN environment to form a virtual array. We then assume that each
access-point further is equipped with a physical antenna array. We also assume that
there are p APs, and they are connected to each other through a high-bandwidth
distribution network such as Ethernet. Also, let the c be number of clients, each with
1 to k element arrays.
The three strategies are based on two guiding principles to provide physical space
security, namely prevent eavesdropper from getting access to the information signals
or overwhelm eavesdropper with more signals than it can sustain such that the infor-
mation signals cannot be decoded. Interestingly, the techniques discussed below do
apply to a an environment with a physical array of physical arrays (a multi-radio
smart antenna AP), but exploration of that dimension of the approaches is beyond
the scope of this work. Also, while the techniques themselves can be applied to a
virtual array of omni-directional antennas, our contention is that the efficacy of the
schemes are minimal due to the lack of spatial/angular control with omni-directional
antennas.
16
3.1 Secret Sharing
3.1.1 Overview
The basic idea of secret sharing is well established in the context of cryptography [8].
In a general t-out-of n secret sharing scheme, a secret message x should be divided
into n shares as
x ⇒ (x1, x2, x3...xn) such that the following properties are satisfied.
• Recoverability: Given any t shares x can be recovered.
• Secrecy: Given any t′ < t shares, absolutely no information can be learned
about x. More formally, Pr(x|t’ shares) = Pr(x)
Access 
Point 1
Access 
Point 2
Access 
Point 3
Client
Eavesdropper
Figure 3: Secret sharing-Illustration
3.1.2 Mechanism
The mechanism exploits the fact that when a single client is reachable from multiple
access points, different shares of the message can be distributed to the clients through
those access points. An eavesdropper in any position in the vicinity of the client or
access points would only be able to gain access to a fraction of the information due
to the spatially disjoint nature of the transmissions that are possible with adaptive
17
arrays unlike with omni antennas. Since adaptive arrays allow only one data signal
to be received at any time, the multiple elements of the array are utilized to perform
beamforming and the scheme is implemented in a time division manner.
Although several secret sharing schemes exist, we are interested in those that do
not significantly increase the traffic load on the network given the limited resources
in wireless environments. In this regard, we consider the all or nothing encryption (as
proposed by Rivest [22],) which is a mechanism to prevent parts of a message from
being recovered until the whole message was received in its entirety. This method
involves encrypting the message with the key, and the key with the message blocks,
thus rendering each unusable until the whole sequence (key and message) is correctly
received.
A modified version of the above algorithm adapted for a WLAN scenario, is pre-
sented here. The mechanism works as follows. Assuming a secure pseudo-random
number generator PRNG, which uses a key K of length ` bits to generate a pseudo-
random sequence PRNG(K). The message that we require to be sent is a bit stream
of length | M |. The message M is XORed with the sequence generated by PRNG(K),
to create a cipher text C of length | C |, which is the same as | M |. This cipher text
is now split into blocks of length ` bits. Each of these blocks are now XORed with
each other and then with the key K. The result is known as C`.
Now the controller divides the new packet C | C` into fragments of length ` bits.
All these fragments must be received successfully at the intended client. When the
receiver receives these fragments, it XORs all the fragments to regenerate the `-bit
encryption key. Once the key is regenerated, the receiver uses it to decrypt the
fragments and aggregates them into a single packet based on the fragment numbers.
The overhead of such a scheme is ` bits for a message of length M bits and provides a
strength of 2` (which means that the overhead increases linearly whereas the number
of potential keys increases exponentially.)
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We illustrate the scheme using a figure. The figure 3 shows three APs and a single
client. Each of the APs possess a share of the information which they communicate to
the client in consecutive time slots. Specifically, AP1 transmits its share to the client
in slot 1, AP2 in slot 2 and AP3 in slot 3. At the end of the three slots, the client
can process the fragments received to decode its packet. On the other hand, consider
an eavesdropper who is positioned along the path between AP1 and the client. Such
an eavesdropper would be able to obtain share 1. However, share 2 is transmitted
from AP2 in the next slot. The eavesdropper cannot receive that share being in the
same location because AP2 would perform power control to reach the client with
the appropriate power for its decodability but the signal power would reduce quickly
before reaching the eavesdropper. The other alternative is for the eavesdropper to
move quickly and place himself in the path from AP2 to the client. In this case, the
speed with which the eavesdropper must move to reposition himself in the direction
of the new path within a time slot, is significant.
3.2 Controlled Jamming
Access
Point 1
Access
Point 2
Access 
Point 3
Client
Eavesdropper
Figure 4: Controlled jamming-Illustration
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3.2.1 Overview
The key concept is to generate interfering signals in a controlled manner such that
those signals cause no (or negligible) interference at an intended receiver, but cause
significant interference to eavesdroppers. In this mechanism, generation of artificial
interference is performed by a few “helper” APs. When sufficient interference is
generated the signal to interference and noise ratio (SINR) at the eavesdropper is
reduced significantly thereby preventing the eavesdropper from obtaining access to
the information itself.
3.2.2 Mechanism
The scheme is illustrated in Figure 4, where a single AP attempts to convey a data
packet to a client. The other APs in the vicinity generate jamming signals with two
constraints: (1) the intended receiver should suffer negligible interference, and (2) the
eavesdropper (whose position is unknown) must suffer as much interference as possi-
ble. Recall that a k element array can be used to suppress interference of k− 1 other
nodes, if it dedicates one DOF for communication. However, this technique differs
from a conventional interference suppression technique in that, a jamming AP does
not serve any client and therefore can use all its k DOFs for performing interference
suppression and still jam several eavesdroppers. In the figure AP1 communicates a
data packet to the client. Simultaneously, AP2,AP3,AP4 generate jamming signals
by placing a null in the direction of the client. Then the maximum allowed power
is used so that most of the region that is unoccupied by clients is filled with jam-
ming signals. In this way, when multiple overlapping jamming signals are received,
an eavesdropper in any of those locations would experience a poor SINR. The eaves-
dropper can attempt to use its k element array to suppress the interference along
the directions of the jamming APs. However, if the number of APs that are in the
vicinity is higher than the number of antenna elements, it would still be unable to
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receive with a sufficient SINR. On the other hand, the client would be unaffected
because the different jamming APs control their beam patterns to place a null in its
direction. In this manner, it is possible to achieve protection against eavesdropping
by utilizing a set of APs for jamming the adversary. The fine grained control that the
k element array provides, enables successful reception at the client while jamming at
the eavesdropper simultaneously. It is important to understand that, while increas-
ing interfering transmissions in an omni-directional communication environment leads
to higher interference and less throughput, the interference suppression capability is
what enables the adaptive arrays to generate jamming signals without affecting the
throughput performance of existing flows in the network. Further, the appropriate
choice of the power to use depends on the gain in the direction of a null. The power
would be limited to be the minimum of the actual power transmission restrictions
(as stipulated by the Federal Communications Commission) and the power that is
guaranteed to keep existing flows unaffected.
3.3 Stream overwhelming
Access 
Point 1
Access
Point 2
Client 1
Client 2
Figure 5: Stream overwhelming-Illustration
3.3.1 Overview
This mechanism exploits the fact that when a node receives more information than
the resources possessed to handle it (overwhelmed node), the different information
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signals mutually interfere with each other resulting in insufficient SINR for each of
these signals. (Here, we use the notion of a stream to indicate each independent
data/information flow that a node receives.). Several valid data transmissions are
coordinated such that every intended receiver has a sufficient SINR for its desired
signal, whereas at other points in the network, the multiple signals interfere to prevent
decodability.
3.3.2 Mechanism
Figure 5 shows an illustration of the idea, where two APs and two clients are consid-
ered. When each client chooses the nearest AP, then there is no stream overwhelming.
However, as in the second part of Figure 5, if the AP client associations are performed
in a suitable manner, the beams overlap, causing a larger region to be overwhelmed,
thereby reducing the exposure area. We also note here that it is not necessary for
the eavesdropper to be present in the overlap of transmission ranges, rather, the
eavesdropper would be left with poor SINR even if it is at a point in the overlap of
interference ranges. Again in this case, when the eavesdropper attempts to receive
from one AP and attempts to suppress interference from other APs, it would still
be limited by his degrees of freedom. If the number of APs communicating simulta-
neously exceeds the number of antennas at the eavesdropper, then it would still be
unable to decode the information streams. The stream overwhelming technique is
different from a conventional interference suppression strategy in the following sense.
Conventional interference suppression aims only at communicating to a node to max-
imize throughput without a consideration of security. Thus, while the use of adaptive
arrays allows multiple parallel transmissions, it is the network-level intelligent choice
of the communicating nodes that makes it possible to provide security by exploiting
stream overwhelming.
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Figure 6: Secret sharing-Impact of k
3.4 Analysis
In this section, each of the baseline strategies is analyzed for their individual per-
formance when the number of antenna elements k and number of APs p are varied.
The simulation parameters used in this section are as described in chapter 6. These
results are graphically illustrated in the Figures 6,7 for secret sharing, Figures 8,9
for controlled jamming and Figures 10,11 for stream overwhelming. In general, the
following observations hold:
• With increasing k, the exposure region reduces.
• With increasing p, the exposure region reduces drastically, in a non-linear fashion.
• When compared to the omni-directional case,for antenna elements ranging from 2
to 12, secret sharing, controlled jamming and stream overwhelming achieve a security
improvement of 5x to 37x, 51x to 122x, 3x to 10x respectively.
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Figure 7: Secret sharing-Impact of p
•Similarly the benefits over beamforming are 3x to 7x, 40x to 54x ,2x to 4x respec-
tively.
•With increasing number of APs, the three schemes achieve,benefits over omni of 4x
to 117x, 12x to 260x,2x to 6x respectively and compared to beamforming case, they
obtain benefits from 2x to 67x, 8x to 170x,2x to 4x respectively.
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CHAPTER IV
ARCHITECTURE AND ALGORITHMS
This chapter describes the architectural and algorithmic aspects of the proposed so-
lution. Specifically, the network model is described along with the considerations
that are required to successfully integrate the strategies developed in the previous
chapter. The problem formulation is then described followed by a description of the
main algorithms.
4.1 Architectural Model
The architectural model that we consider consists of a central controller connected
to several access points as shown in the figure 12. The controller receives from the
backbone a stream of packets to be transmitted over the wireless LAN to the clients.
For such packets, it employs a combination of the schemes discussed in Section 3, and
forwards the packets to the appropriate access-points. We assume that the controller
has strict synchronization and control over the access-points. All transmissions by
the APs are done at the granularity of synchronized fragment slots, where the length
of a fragment slot is smaller than that of a packet slot. The controller controls both
the downstream and upstream (we discuss upstream communication toward the end
of the section) modes of communication, and the two modes alternate in epochs. For
downstream communication, the controller divides packets into fragments, applies its
security decisions, and provides the APs with a set of fragments to transmit.
4.2 Integrated Operations
While we discussed the three key strategies of secret sharing, controlled jamming, and
stream overwhelming in Section 3, an important element of the operations is how are
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Figure 12: Network Model
the three techniques used in tandem to achieve the best performance possible? While
we present the details of the integrated operations in the description of the algorithms
later in the section, we now briefly discuss the important constraints and trade-offs
that form the basis of the algorithmic design. Briefly, two types of considerations
need to be taken into account in deciding on the specific form of integration between
the three techniques:
• Security vs. throughput: The primary trade-off in using the VAPA techniques
outlined thus far for security is in the form of throughput. However, the three
techniques differ in the extents of the trade-offs. Stream overwhelming provides
its security benefits without any degradation in throughput. controlled jamming,
on the other hand, uses access-points (other than the primary sender) purely for
generating interference, and hence trade-off throughput the most. Finally, secret
sharing can achieve certain levels of security without trading-off throughput, but
can also trade-off throughput further to achieve a higher level of security. Hence,
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from a security - throughput trade-off standpoint, controlled jamming performs
the best for security, but the worst for throughput. Stream overwhelming does
exactly the opposite, while secret sharing lies in the middle. Thus, for any set-up
with security objectives with throughput constraints, the above trade-offs will
have to be taken into account while determining the extent to which each of
the three techniques will be used.
• Network resources and topology:
Another important set of influencing factors includes the number of elements
at the APs (and clients), the number of APs, and the specific topology. For
example, if a client is accessible only through one AP, it cannot receive any secret
sharing benefits. Stream overwhelming benefits can be achieved as long as AP-
client pairs within interference range of each other are scheduled to transmit
together. Finally, controlled jamming can be accomplished as long as there is
one or more APs within interference range of a scheduled transmission. From
a number of resources standpoint, secret sharing depends more on the number
of APs, whereas controlled jamming and stream overwhelming depend more on
the number of elements on the APs.
Based on the above considerations, it is clear that the desired throughput-security
values and the available network resources and topology determine the right choice
of strategies. Hence, the main guiding principles adopted for the algorithm design
are as follows: (i) For a desired security, if capacity has to be maximized, then one
must determine whether the security is achievable by purely stream overwhelming or
secret sharing alone. If not, then the minimal number of APs necessary for controlled
jamming needs to be used such that it will guarantee the desired level of security, and
use the remaining APs for secret sharing or stream overwhelming to improve security
while maximizing the capacity. (ii) Similarly, for a desired throughput constraint,
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if security has to be maximized, a combination of stream overwhelming and secret
sharing (with preference to secret sharing) should be used for achieving the desired
throughput, and the remaining APs should be devoted to controlled jamming to
maximize security.
In the rest of the thesis, we consider only the model where subject to a throughput
constraint, security needs to be maximized. All discussions can be extended with
minimal effort for the alternate model as well.
4.3 Problem Formulation
In the model described thus far, the intelligence is concentrated at the controller and
can be divided into two major components, the throughput scheduler and the security
scheduler. The throughput scheduler takes as input a throughput constraint S and
determines the maximum number of packets j that are schedulable subject to a bound
of S. This value j is then fed into the security scheduler that then determines the
right strategies to use to maximize security while transmitting the j packets.
The problem formulation for the two components is described below. Consider
that the controller has an infinite stream of packets in its queue. We assume that any
fairness mechanisms are implemented even before the packets reach the controller. In
this fashion, the security algorithm works without affecting the fairness and is agnostic
to the fairness mechanism used. The algorithm serves packets only in the order that
they were queued to prevent potential starvation and out-of-order delivery problems .
The throughput constraint fed to the algorithm is S, the minimum number of packets
to be transmitted during a slot (if schedulable). The objective of the algorithm is
then to determine the AP actions for each fragment duration in-order to maximize
the number of consecutive data packets that can be scheduled subject to an upper
bound of S. Once the number of consecutive data packets is determined, then the
algorithm tries to maximize the security benefit.
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The formulation is presented in figures 13 and 14.
Given G(V, E),
V = M∪N : set of vertices
M : set of APs
N : set of clients
E: set of edges
wij =
{
1 : input packet stream
0 : otherwise
K: number of elements on each AP
Given Ps,
1≤s≤S: input packet stream
n(Ps)∈N : destination client of packet Ps
Output:
Mapping from S′ packets to APs
m(Ps)∈M , 1≤s≤S′
Solution:
Maximize S′
Subject to:
(1) Each AP sends at most one packet
m(Ps)6=m(Pt), s6=t, 1≤s≤S′, 1≤t≤S′
(2) Each client receives at most one packet.
m(Ps)6=m(Pt), s6=t, 1≤s≤S′, 1≤t≤S′
(3) Each active AP has at most k − 1 interfaced active clients.
∀s, 1≤s≤S′,
S′∑
t=1,t6=s
w(m(Ps),n(Ps))(m(Pt),n(Pt))≤k − 1
Figure 13: Throughput scheduling optimization
The first part in the formulation is to determine the number of in-sequence packets
j that can be scheduled out of the first S packets. S is thus a tunable knob which can
be used to tune the desired levels of security in the network. For instance, if S = 1,
then the problem reduces to maximizing security for this single packet’s transmission.
However, when S is larger (bound by the number of APs) then throughput is max-
imized, and any security achieved is opportunistic using unassigned resources. Note
that, given a set of S packets, the number of in-sequence packets that are schedulable
is not fixed but depends on the way APs are assigned. Thus the largest number of
packets that can be scheduled will be achieved for the optimal scheduling algorithm.
In the second part of the problem, the security mechanisms need to be applied to
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Given Ps,
1≤s≤S: input of schedulable packet stream
Output:
Mapping from S′ packets to F fragments to APs
m(Ps, f)∈M , 1≤s≤S′ 1≤f≤F
Solution:
Minimize max(ER(Ps))
Subject to:
(1) Each AP sends at most one packet in one fragment.
∀f , m(Ps, f)6=m(Pt, f), s6=t, 1≤s≤S′, 1≤f≤F , 1≤t≤S′
(2) Each active AP has at most k − 1 interfaced active clients.
∀f ,∀s, 1≤f≤F , 1≤s≤S ′,
S′∑
t=1,t6=s
w(m(Ps,f),n(Ps))(m(Pt,f),n(Pt))≤k − 1
Where:
Exposure region of packet Ps:
ER(Ps) =
⋂
1≤f≤F
ER(Ps, f)
Exposure region of packet Ps in fragment f:
ER(Ps, f) = {(x, y)∈R2|SINR(x, y, i, f) ≥ threshold}
SINR of packet Ps at (x, y) in fragment f :
SINR(x, y, Ps, f) =
Wm(Ps,f)
·Gm(Ps,f)
(x,y)
{dm(Ps,f)
(x,y)}α
Noise+
S′P
t=1,t6=s
Wm(Pt,f)
·Gm(Pt,f)
(x,y)
{dm(Pt,f)
(x,y)}α
+
P
i∈F Af
Wi·Gi(x,y)
di(x,y)
Wi: transmission power of i-th AP
Gi(x, y): gain of i-th AP toward (x, y)
di(x, y): distance from i-th AP to (x, y)
α: path loss factor
FAf : free APs in fragment f
,where FAf = {i∈M |m(Ps, f)6=i, 1≤s≤S‘ }
Figure 14: Security optimization
the j in-sequence packets such that those j packets are transmitted by the end of the
slot but the security is maximized for these j packets. The problem is thus concerned
with appropriate choice of strategies for the APs during the fragment durations of
this slot.
4.4 Idealized model and algorithms
The idealized model for the application of the proposed security solution, as described
earlier, consists of a central controller which controls the communication actions of
each of the access points. In such a case, the access points have a high degree of
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synchronization and do not take independent actions. Further, the access points act
exactly as dictated by the controller. The controller is also assumed to have access
to the head of line packet of the queue in each access point and thus has complete
command over what packets get transmitted on the wireless network at all time. The
controller is also assumed to know the positions of the access points and clients in the
network. We focus only the downstream communication here, and revisit upstream
communication later in the section. We now present the details of the two cascaded
schedulers at the controller.
4.4.1 Throughput Scheduler
The throughput scheduler takes as input the control parameter S and the first S
packets in the input queue of the controller. It provides as output the set S’ of the j
schedulable in-sequence packets. The algorithm used is a greedy algorithm that at-
tempts to maximize j, the number of insequence packets that would be served during
this transmission slot considering the spatial reuse and the adaptive interference sup-
pression capability.1. The working of the algorithm can be understood by observing
the pseudo-code.
The throughput scheduler first calculates how many clients for this packet stream
can potentially use an AP, for each of the APs in the AP set M (lines 1-2). Then,
for each packet starting from the first packet in the queue, the set of available APs
is computed (line 4). Of this set, the one with minimum potential clients is chosen
to be the one for this packet (line 5-7), as long as there is some such AP. Then the
available APs, DOFs at each APs, and the number of potential clients are updated
at each AP. In this fashion, the number of schedulable packets in sequence is given
by the number of packets that could be assigned.
1Note that while we use a greedy algorithm as a representative, any throughput scheduling
algorithm designed for adaptive arrays is usable at this stage.
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S′: schedulable number of packets
PS: schedulable packet stream
PSs: first s packets in the packet stream
pl: l
th packet in PS
F : number of fragments
r(a, b): available DOF of AP a for fragment b
f : fragment index
E: network Connectivity matrix
AP (n): set of APs within communication range of client n
n(pi): destination(client) id of packet Pi,
Wij : (i, j)-th element of link conflict matrix,
W(ab)(cd): link conflict indicator between links ab and cd,
m(p, f) : assigned AP id of packet p during fragment f
Action(a, f): action of AP a for fragment duration f
N : set of clients for which packets are destined in PS
M : set of APs which are in range of clients in N
Figure 15: Definition of variables
4.4.2 Security scheduler
The objective of the security scheduler is to identify the assignment of actions of
APs for different fragment durations such that all the packets handed down by the
throughput scheduler are scheduled, while minimizing the exposure region. These are
performed in a greedy manner, where secret sharing is the default strategy. However,
when there is a tie between two choices of available APs for a fragment, both giving
the same secret sharing benefit, then stream overwhelming is used as the strategy
of choice. Once the possible fragments are scheduled (i.e the throughput scheduler’s
constraint on number of packets is met), controlled jamming is attempted in the free
fragment durations. The free APs determine if the number of clients, for which to
perform interference suppression, is less than k-1. If so, that AP performs jamming
for that fragment duration, otherwise, the next free fragment duration is checked.
The pseudocode describes the mechanisms. Particularly, the edge connectivity
matrix is given as E, where an entry of 1 in the (i, j)th position indicates that node i
and node j are within communication range of each other. The link conflict matrix is
given as W, where Wij is 1 if the links i and j are interfering links. Similarly W(ab)(cd)
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Greedy Throughput() :
INPUT: S, PS, m(Ps), E, W
OUTPUT: m(Ps)
1 For each a in M
2 NC(a) = Calculate Number of possible clients
3 For each value s from 1 to S
4 APS(s) = Calculate available APs(n(Ps))
5 MAP = Find Minimum NC(APS)
6 If MAP 6= NULL
7 m(PIj) = MAP
8 Increment assigned
9 Update Available APS
10 Update Available DOF
11 Update NC
12 S′ = assigned
Figure 16: Throughput scheduler
represents whether links ab and cd interfere with each other. The algorithm takes
as input the set of schedulable packets provided by the throughput scheduler, the
connectivity and interference matrices of the network, and the set of client destination
ids of the packets. As output, the algorithm provides the actions of the different APs
for the different timeslots. This is indicated by Action(a, f) to indicate the action
of AP a during fragment duration f. The action can either be a transmission of a
fragment to a client c (indicated by Action = c in the pseudocode) or controlled
jamming with care about clients (indicated by Action = JAM)in the vicinity. Based
on this, the APs to which each fragment of each packet is destined (m(ps, f) in the
pseudocode) can also be obtained.
To begin with all the APs reachable from a client are included in the list of available
APs for each client. Then the packets are arranged in ascending order of the number
of APs(line 8). This is because clients with fewer number of APs should definitely be
scheduled and must not lose their AP to other clients who may want to perform secret
sharing. The next step is to identify the availability of each of the APs of the client
under consideration for the different fragment durations (lines 11-13). Specifically,
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Initialize() :
1 For each m in M
2 For 1≤f≤F
3 r(m, f) = k
4 For each n in N
5 AP (n) = {m∈M |(m, n)∈E}
6 PI = PS
Security :
INPUT: S′, PS, m(Ps), E, W
OUTPUT: Action(Ap, f), m(Ps, f)
7 Initialize()
8 sort ascending(Pi,NUM APS)
9 For each packet i from 1 to S ′
10 n = n(pi)
11 For each fragment f
12 For each AP m
13 Avail(m, f) = Determine availability(m,n,f ,i)
14 APList =Sort ascending(APs,fragment num)
15 Adjust stream overwhelming(APList)
16 For each AP in APList
17 fragment =Select random availablefragments
18 Action(AP, fragment) = n(pi)
19 For each free AP a
20 For each free slot t
21 Action(a, t) = JAM
Figure 17: Security scheduler
the number of fragment durations that each AP is available and which of the fragment
durations each AP is available. The availability of an AP during a fragment is decided
by the number of already scheduled active clients in its vicinity and the number of
DOF that it possesses. For instance, if there are already k-1 scheduled transmissions
in the vicinity of this AP for that fragment duration, then any additional transmission
would surely cause interference. Next, the available APs are sorted in ascending order
of the number of slots in which they are available. The AP with the fewest available
fragments is scheduled first because, the allocation tries to greedily assign different
APs for the fragment durations to obtain the secret sharing benefit. For instance,
if an AP is available for only one fragment duration and another available AP is
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allocated during that fragment, then this AP would not be included( reducing the
secret sharing benefit). Lines 15-18 describe the AP allocation. The APs are allocated
in a round robin manner such that for each AP one of the available fragment durations
is picked randomly. Such a technique has an advantage over randomly selecting one
of the available APS for each fragment duration. This technique ensures that as many
different APs are chosen as possible, whereas in selecting one of the available APs
randomly for each fragment, there is a finite probability that a single AP is chosen
for all fragments minimizing the secret sharing benefit. The algorithm thus ensures
that the secret sharing benefit is maximized greedily. Here, when there are more than
one APs with same number of available fragment durations, the choice of AP is such
that stream overwhelming is possible (Line 15 indicates this).
Once the data schedules are completed, the controlled jamming strategy is applied
(lines 19-21). For all the free fragment durations, the number of scheduled clients in
the vicinity of that particular AP for that duration is determined. If this value is
lesser than k-1, then it is possible to perform controlled jamming without interfering
with legal clients and the AP is assigned a jamming action. However, if there are
already enough clients in the vicinity, then controlled jamming would not be applied.
In this way, the algorithm greedily applies the techniques according to the design
guidelines presented in the previous section.
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CHAPTER V
PRACTICAL REALIZATION
In this chapter, the issue of practicality is discussed. First, it is described how, using
currently existing standards a solution can be constructed without significant modi-
fications. Further, the systems related requirements are listed , along with pointers
about their current existence in the industry.
5.1 Protocol and standards
We now briefly discuss an approach for practical realization of the strategies discussed
thus far in the context of the 802.11 PCF (point coordination function) mode of
operation. The 802.11 PCF is an access mechanism that operates in the infrastructure
mode, where an access point of a cell acts as the central coordinator called the Point
Coordinator(PC). The PC grants a contention free channel access to individual nodes
by polling them for transmissions. On being polled, a node transmits a single frame.
In the infrastructure mode, time is divided into periodic superframes which start with
the beacon frames. At the beginning of a superframe, the PC waits for a PCF Inter
Frame Spacing (PIFS) for the channel to be idle and then transmits the beacon frame
which is a broadcast packet carrying special information. The PC, then consecutively
polls each of the stations that operate in PCF mode, one at a time. At the end of
the CFP, the PC sends a CF-END frame to signal the end of that CFP.
The PCF mode of operation is well-suited to the proposed solution in the context
of a virtual array of physical arrays. The polling based mechanism endows the PC with
the exact transmission slots for each client’s communication. The controller can assign
the sequence to be used by each PC. Since the controller acts as a central decision
maker, the exact assignment of actions to each AP in the network is possible and is
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accomplished within the current framework of the WLAN PCF mode of operation.
However, since transmissions are arranged always in an “AP first, client-next
manner”, the actions of the APs for the durations of the client communication must
also be determined. Specifically, since each AP listens for the reply from a client, it
cannot be utilized to perform other actions such as counter jamming. Hence, when
the clients talk, the counter-jamming APs must now perform interference suppression
with respect to the APs and not the clients. In this fashion, the existing solution can
be adapted to take the direction of information flow and the slotted access within the
PCF mode of operation.
While the basic security solution has been presented in the context of downstream
communication, it is relatively straightforward to extend the schemes to the upstream
communication as well. To make correct decisions, it is necessary to obtain infor-
mation about the time slot that different clients would use for their transmission.
However, the use of a polling based mechanism, enables the AP to know what time
duration a transmission can be expected from a client. This information is used along
with the client positions to generate different communication patterns. More specif-
ically, the controller performs centralized control to determine the actions of APs
for the downlink, whereas the polling to cater to the clients and provide upstream
security can be obtained by the APs controlling the polling sequence. This would
enable the controlled jamming technique to be applied with the modification that
nulls are placed by the jamming AP towards other APs in the vicinity as opposed to
clients. However, stream overwhelming could be performed by adjusting the polling
sequence. Also, the secret sharing approach can be applied by the client transmitting
fragments to different APs consecutively. This will require that the client be able to
obtain a dedicated fragment duration to transmit to each of the APs. In this manner,
the basic schemes are applied with modifications of parameters.
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5.2 System requirements
The following paragraph is used to illustrate the main system design issues that
need to be addressed to make the overall solution practical. (1) Beamforming weight
determination: When a node needs to beamform to another node, the antenna weights
for the other node must be available. This can be obtained using standard pilot
symbols or preambles. Such an approach is already employed in cellular systems
and also in upcoming standards like IEEE 802.16 [2], IEEE 802.11n [1] (2) Weight
adaptation resolution: When the client node mobility is limited, the beamforming
weights need to be adapted , in order to form an accurate beam towards the desired
client. (3) Beam setting time: The time required to actually set the beam and for
the antenna to settle, is an important system consideration. While the actual setting
time depends on the exact system detail, setting at packet granularity is already
accomplished in some commercial products [3].
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CHAPTER VI
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This chapter evaluates the proposed solution using simulations and field trials and
establishes the magnitude of benefits achievable for different network conditions.
6.1 Simulation Model
The simulations were carried out using a custom simulator written in C++. The
custom simulator incorporates the following modules: smart antennas pattern com-
putation [15], ability to perform adaptive array processing [21] and indoor channel
models .
The details of the models are :
• Beamforming: Simulation support is developed for generating a desired beam-
pattern and also to perform adaptive interference suppression using the tech-
niques described in [21].
• Channel model: For the channel model, various models were implemented to
account for the indoor propagation law. Specifically, the ITU model was used.
This model accounts for the variation in power levels and fading.We also con-
sider the ITU model for indoor attenuation and a link margin of 3.2 dB ( 3dB
with a 90% link reliability). We consider an operating frequency of 2.4 GHz,
an SNR threshold of 15 dB and a noise level of -100dBm (0.1pW). Further ,
we use a sensitivity of -85dBm (3 pW) and a maximum transmission power of
20dBm (100mW) as used in standard 802.11 equipment . The default values of
parameters are : number of antennas is 4 and number of APs is 4.
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• Positions: The position of the client and AP positions are generated randomly
within the grid of points in a 100m * 100m grid. Such a grid size was chosen to
incorporate the fact that indoor ranges are much smaller than actual free-space
ranges. The position of the client is also chosen randomly within this grid. The
eavesdropper’s position was also selected randomly within the grid. The default
number of clients chosen is set as 20.
• Traffic flow: Downstream flows are setup to a randomly chosen subset of clients.
The number of clients selected is decided by the selection parameter S (described
in Chapter 5) and the output of the algorithm. The default value of selection
parameter is the same as that of the number of APs.For each data point, the
average of 20 simulation runs is calculated.
• Metric: Here the metric of interest is given by the exposure region as defined in
section 2. When multiple clients exist in the network we consider two metrics ,
namely the average exposure region of the clients over different client positions
and the maximum exposure region of any client over different client positions.
6.2 Simulation results
The exposure region for the integrated algorithm is described in the following, as the
parameters are varied.
1. Varying number of elements k:
In this part, we explore the effect of varying the number of antenna elements on
the APs.From Figure 18 and 19, as the number of elements on the APs is increased,
the exposure region is reduced in both the average and worst case scenarios. We also
observe that the exposure region is extremely small when the integrated algorithm
operates. Further, and more importantly, the exposure region of simple beamforming
is much larger compared to the integrated solution. This means that it is only the
intelligent use of the mechanisms that gives large security gains and not just simple
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beamforming. Further, the throughput also increases with increasing k.
2. Varying number of Access Points p:
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Figure 18: Impact of k - Average exposure region
Figures 20 and 21 plot the average and worst case exposure region as the num-
ber of access points is varied. We observe again that the exposure region reduces
drastically as the number of APs is increased. Specifically, with 12 APs, a 2000x
improvement is possible when a single eavesdropper is considered.
3. Varying value of tuning parameter S and throughput:
The results for varying S values is shown in Figures 22 and 23 for the average case
and worst case respectively. As the value S is varied from low to high, the impor-
tance shifts from security to throughput. The figures show that security value does
not degrade significantly as the value of S changes from low to high. This means
that although the throughput is optimized, the security is not degraded significantly
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Figure 19: Impact of k - Worst case exposure region
for the given network conditions. However, we observe that while the throughput
increases with increase in S, the security benefit does not degrade. This is counter-
intuitive and means that the stream overwhelming benefit also increases when the
number of scheduled transmissions increases. This suggests that the intelligent use
of all the three techniques enables maximizing both throughput and security without
any significant trade-off.
4. Varying number of colluding eavesdroppers:
Here, we simulate the effect of colluding eavesdroppers as follows. For each packet
destined to a client, we calculate if at the end of the slot duration, the eavesdroppers
together have all the fragments for a client’s packet. Here the metric of exposure
region by itself is not sufficient. Hence the metric used here is the packet exposure
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Figure 20: Impact of p - Average exposure region
ratio. Packet exposure ratio for a given scenario is the number of packets that eaves-
droppers can decode by collusion divided by the number of packets scheduled in a
slot. By computing this over several runs, we identify the average exposed probability.
This metric is shown in Figures 24 and 25 for the average and worst case respectively.
One can observe that with 4 Access points and with 4 element arrays each, the aver-
age packet exposure ratio grows very gradually with increasing number of colluding
eavesdroppers. Here we recall that collusion can only affect secret sharing,whereas
controlled jamming and stream overwhelming would be unaffected by collusion. This
explains why only with a large number of colluding eavesdroppers there is some in-
crease in packet exposure ratio.i.e even with 25 colluding eavesdroppers the packet
exposure ratio is less than 20%. However, from the worst case results, we obtain that
as the number of eavesdroppers increases beyond the number of access points and
antenna elements, the exposure ratio tends to 1. However, the results show a much
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Figure 21: Impact of p - Worst case exposure region
gradual degradation in exposure ratio then in the case of simple beamforming. These
results indicate the strength of the technique to eavesdropper capability.
5. Varying mobility of eavesdroppers:
As the eavesdroppers move, the algorithm would still work in the same manner as
when the eavesdropper did not move. This is because, the algorithm does not assume
any information about the mobility of the eavesdroppers. When the eavesdropper
was allowed to move with a velocity from 5m/s to 20m/s, the security performance
sees no significant change.
6. Throughput variation:
Although security is the main focus of the work, we are interested in exploring what
throughput degradation will occur by using resources for security instead of through-
put. The throughput results are shown in Figures 27 and 28. From the figures,
one can conclude that the integrated algorithm is able to successfully ensure security
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Figure 22: Variation of S - Average case
without any significant degradation in throughput. One can also observe that the
network throughput saturates at a throughput value determined by the topology and
number of nodes in the network. However, the general observation is that , for a
fixed security level, the throughput increases with increasing antenna elements k or
number of APs p since there are more resources available.
6.3 Proof of concept field trials
The objective of this section is to demonstrate that the proposed security solution
can be applied to indoor environmental settings using minimal changes to off the shelf
components. The field trials are carried out in the fifth floor of a high rise building 29.
The equipment used consists of 4 commercial 802.11g (LINKSYS) broadband router
equipped with two antennas and a laptop. The effect of beamforming is achieved by
the use of a custom-built mechanical structure to provide a beamwidth of 60 degrees
47
00.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Size of input packet stream (S)
W
o
rs
t c
as
e 
ex
po
su
re
 
re
gi
o
n
Integrated operation (4 APs, 4 elements)
Integrated operation (8 APs, 8 elements)
Integrated operation (12 APs, 12 elements)
Figure 23: Variation of S - Worst case
and a mainlobe gain of 10 dB. 21 positions on the corridors of the building were iden-
tified for the experiment, with one client position and 20 as potential eavesdropper
positions. The experiments conducted was the sending of ping packets from a lap-
top to the Access Point. The successful reception at any point is determined by the
success of the ping packets. The table 1 shows the potential position in this setup,
where an eavesdropper can decode the communication of an AP. Each row in the
table represents the potential eavesdropper positions. A ∨ symbol indicates that it is
possible to decode the signal successfully, whereas a ”.” symbol implies that the signal
is not decodable. The second and third rows of the table show the points at which an
eavesdropper can successfully decode the signal when the AP communicating to the
client uses simple omni-directional antenna and a beamforming antenna respectively.
The next two rows represent the points at which an eavesdropper can decode the sig-
nal when just secret sharing or secret sharing and controlled jamming is used as the
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Figure 24: Eavesdropper collusion - Average case
strategy.It can be observed that the number of potential eavesdropper points is pro-
gressively reduced as each technique is applied and the maximum benefit is obtained
using the integrated solution of beamforming+secret sharing+controlled jamming.
The results show that although scattering exists, benefits are still obtainable in an
indoor setting when the proposed solution is applied.
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Figure 26: Impact of eavesdropper mobility
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 Figure 29: Floor map
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Table 1: Field trials
Measurement Position 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
OMNI ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨
BF . . ∨ ∨ . . ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ .
BF+SS . . . . . . . . . . .
BF+CJ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ . . .
BF+SS+CJ . . . . . . . . . . .
Measurement Position 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Total
OMNI ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ . . 18
BF ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ . ∨ ∨ 14
BF+SS . . ∨ . . ∨ . ∨ ∨ 4
BF+CJ ∨ ∨ . ∨ ∨ ∨ . ∨ ∨ 14
BF+SS+CJ . . . . . ∨ . ∨ ∨ 3
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CHAPTER VII
RELATED WORKS
The security problems in WLANs have been well documented in [10, 7, 24]. There
are also several solutions to specific problems in WLAN but all such works are purely
higher layer cryptographic mechanisms [9, 25]. In fact standardization of security
techniques for wireless LANs has also been accomplished in the form of IEEE 802.11i
[12]. In [17], the authors propose a shared key strategy that generates and extract
keys from channel state information. In rich scattering environment, the eavesdropper
experiences different channel because of high decorrelation from the sender-receiver
path, and as a result it extracts a different key. In [13], the authors describe how the
signal strength information called signalprint can be exploited to prevent malicious
transmitter from attacking the wireless network such as denial-of-service. Based on
the fact that the signalprints are strongly correlated with the clients’ location, the
proposed scheme detects and tags suspicious packets. In both the above examples,
the authors do not consider smart antennas and the goals are different.
In [23], the authors propose an authentication scheme that uses dual smart an-
tennas. In this paper, an adaptive beam-forming antenna is used to identify and
locate the legal user through receiving the authentication packets (called antenna ID
authentication), and a switched multiple-beam antenna is used for transmissions of
data packets. The focus of this work is orthogonal to the one in this paper. Another
security technique is described in [11], where the authors discuss spatial data striping
techniques that increase the degree of security using a phased array antenna in 802.11
environments. However no algorithms or solution details are provided, and no specific
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security metrics are considered or evaluated. In [19], the authors describe a theoret-
ical communication scheme in which coding using the multiple degrees of freedom is
used to generate “artificial noise“, which degrades only the eavesdropper’s channel
quality. Again, the paper does not provide any protocol or solution details, requires
strict channel synchronization, and does not consider the eavesdropper equipped with
smart antennas.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
8.1 Conclusion
In sum, the idea of using spatial smartness to provide security against eavesdrop-
ping was introduced. Specifically, the security implications of using smart antennas
were described in the context of a WLAN , using the abstraction of a virtual ar-
ray of physical arrays. Three novel mechanisms that fundamentally improve security
against eavesdropping were described and their benefits quantified through extensive
simulations. Further, the trade-offs in the use of the three schemes were highlighted
and a greedy algorithm to obtain a the highest integrated benefit was described. The
performance of the algorithm was evaluated using simulations. Finally, we believe
that this is the first solution that uses capability of smart antennas at higher layers
for security. Significant gains over both omni-directional and simple beamforming
techniques indicate the power of the mechanisms. Although we have provided three
novel mechanisms, a more complete exploration of the trade-offs and the optimal
benefits achievable are part of future work.
8.2 Future work
In this section, we briefly discuss a few issues that pertain to the approaches presented
in the thesis thus far. We believe that these are important issues, but can be addressed
as part of future research with this work forming the basis.
Scattering effects: In the presence of scattering, signals arrive at the receiver from
multiple paths with varying amplitude and phases. Weight adaptation is the primary
technique used in beamforming to tackle scattering. While the total area of the beam
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will not change with adapted weights, the shapes of the beams do change. We contend
that the as long as the angular spread is not very large, benefits outlined in this work
are still good approximations of achievable security. In the event that the angular
spread is large, one possible solution is to use a learning process with the cooperation
of other legal clients to understand coarse-level characteristics of the scattering, and
use this information in the scheduling algorithms.
3-D model: We have used a 2-D model for the area of exposure in this work, which
results in an area of interest. We believe that extending the results and the algorithms
to a 3-D model that considers volume of exposure is possible in a straightforward
manner. Perhaps more importantly, the security benefits demonstrated thus far can
be expected to increase when a 3-D model is adopted as the benefits of smart antennas
will now be raised to a larger exponent.
Multiple associations and co-channel APs: This work makes two assumptions
about multiple client associations and multiple co-channel APs. While current WLANs
operate on different channels to reduce interference, the proliferation of WLANs and
the limited number of available channels, has already lead to multiple co-channel APs
naturally co-existing in a single channel [5]. Furthermore, with smart antennas it is
possible to sustain multiple co-channel transmissions in a given region justifying the
choice even further. Further, while multiple AP associations for a client is not cur-
rently enabled due to ease of identifying downstream clients through their associated
APs, this requirement does not have a fundamental basis and is likely to change since
multiple associations has other benefits such as diversity and capacity as well.
Effects of client mobility: While we considered eavesdropper mobility in the per-
formance evaluation, we have not considered client mobility thus far. It can be argued
that the only impact client mobility will have on the proposed solutions is in terms
of how fast the location information of the clients can be fed back to the controller.
Even in the presence of location errors, because of the controller’s assumption of a
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link margin, the performance should still not suffer. Furthermore, since decisions of
the controller are taken at a per slot level, and mobility of clients is likely to occur
at much coarser granularities, very minimal impact is likely to be experienced by the
algorithms presented.
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